Understanding the True Strategy of Blitzkrieg

The word Blitzkrieg, meaning lightning war, is most of the time simply described as the doctrine employed by the German Army in World War II. Blitzkrieg, according to many historians, was used to devastating effect in Poland in 1939, in France and the Low Countries in 1940 and in the Soviet Union in 1941; it harnessed the firepower and mobility of the German panzer divisions through aggressive leadership at both the strategic and tactical level.

Blitzkrieg was created out of necessity and is about annihilation of the enemy. It has been a strategy that influenced the German General Staff since the 1890s because of the fear of a two front war. A quick decision or victory was necessary in the West in order to be able to fight the Russians on the Eastern Front. In order to win decisively, annihilation of the enemy was necessary and the only complete way to annihilate the enemy is through encirclement. The strategy was formed prior to the use of these tactics of World War II, and can be traced back to the decades leading to World War I.

With the commencement of the First World War, the German General Staff was confronted with the possibility of the ultimate German nightmare, a two front war against numerous enemies strong enough to defeat Germany. The search for an answer to this problem fell to Field Marshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen who was the Chief of the General Staff. Schlieffen’s operational ideas dominated German military thinking until 1945 and it was from these ideas that the strategic concept of Blitzkrieg grew. Germany was virtually encircled by their enemies-- Britain and France to the west, Russia to the east and later Italy to the south. These enemies also possessed larger manpower reserves, greater industrial strength, and direct access to the resources of the rest of the world which could be denied to Germany by a blockade cutting off Germany from other continents. For these reasons, a short war was the only possible way to win a war because a long conflict was almost certain to drain Germany’s resources and end her chances to win. Schlieffen’s solution to this problem was deceptively simple. Germany had to annihilate one opponent speedily so that it could then throw its weight completely against the other. An enemy army will not allow itself to be annihilated if it possesses any means of escape and the only way to deny the enemy a means of escape is through encirclement. The reason for the emphasis on annihilation is that it makes the victory decisive. An army can be destroyed in battle but if most of its soldiers are able to escape, a new army can be formed out of the survivors. This is not possible if an army is annihilated. Furthermore, the prospect of one’s slaughtered countrymen thrusts iron into the soul of the survivors and renders them less likely to renew the struggle quickly.  Schlieffen’s primary aim was the neutralization of a two front war through the quick defeat of the French army. The need to destroy at first the French forces on the Western Front, followed by an offensive against the Russians in the East created several challenges. The notion of operational flexibility was lost because in order for the operation to have even a chance to be successful, a complex series of mobilization and deployment schedules bound to an inalterable timeline had to be followed. This was one of the major challenges in the Schlieffen Plan. Because of these challenges, and subsequent modifications by his successors, Schlieffen’s “great wheel” through the Low Countries to encircle the French Army before it could effectively mobilize failed.

Following the horrific experiences of World War I, the German High Command knew that a prolonged stalemate of trench and positional warfare could not be the answer for any future war. Hans von Seeckt, the chief of the Army Command of the German Reichswehr from 1921 to 1926, became the father of the new German Army which was designed not on masse but mobility. Seeckt knew that only the offensive, and so the destruction of enemy forces, would bring final victory. He further believed that the German experience in both 1914 and 1918 had proved that an effective regular army must in future meet three demands: first higher mobility by the fullest possible use of motor transport; secondly a logistical system strengthened by increased motorization which was capable of continuous replacement of men and material at the front; and thirdly a greater degree of independence from the civilian reserves so that the Army might mobilize more rapidly, take the initiative, and perhaps be able to strike before the enemy’s Nation in Arms could mobilize. In the Second World War, the danger of a two front war was avoided with the lightning attack and conquest of France in 1940 which furthermore resulted in the gain of raw materials such as ore as well as military equipment that was extremely needed for future Blitzoperationnen. In order to understand the thesis, that Blitzkrieg is a strategic term that needs to be redefined, a closer look at the different levels of Blitzkrieg is helpful.

Blitzkrieg can be separated into three levels. First, at the tactical level, the aggressive use of “combined arms” is usually described as Blitzkrieg. Next is the operational level, in which higher commands plan and conduct campaigns which are aimed at creating the conditions to achieve strategic objectives. This includes not only movement and manoeuvre, but also a speedy mobilization of troops and equipment. Lastly, there is the strategic level which is the responsibility of the highest command and where cooperation among political, economic, and military agencies work together to accomplish political wartime objectives, which is the true Blitzkrieg strategy of Germany.

The different preparation phases of Blitzkrieg can be described as the planning phase, in which the Germans select the point or points of attack, the reconnaissance phase, during which the plan is finalized; and the surprise phase, which includes measures to make the enemy unaware of imminent attack at the precise time and location. The next phase, the actual combat or action phase, can be divided into the roles of the Air Force and Army. The mission of the Air Force is to destroy the enemy’s air force, preferably on the ground during the first 24 hours, in order to gain air superiority and free the German Air Force to provide close air support for ground units, including interdiction of enemy supplies and communications to bring about enemy paralysis. The mission of the Army is to conduct a concentrated ground attack which followed a brief artillery bombardment, and included Panzers, mechanized infantry and mobile artillery in an effort to force a breach in enemy defences. Army forces pour through the breach and punch deep into enemy territory, using speed to maintain the advance and keep the enemy off balance. Due to the importance of speed, enemy strong points are bypassed until the panzer pincers gradually encircle whole enemy armies in giant pockets and then hold this perimeter until the slower moving infantry divisions catch up and annihilate these pockets, bringing a quick and decisive victory.

There are three factors which form the basis for an offensive action. They are surprise, speed and superiority in material or firepower. Surprise can take three forms: strategic, technical and tactical. Strategic surprise is gained by the concentration of forces and by movement towards action carried out in such a way that the attacker strikes on a certain front with a force considerably larger than that of the defence. Technical surprise derives from the use in battle of an unknown weapon or means of movement; and tactical surprise derives normally from the combination of technical surprise and the use of new tactics that are more suitable than the old for the new weapons and material. Speed, the second factor in successful attack, is the necessary complement to surprise. Because surprise can only gain temporary success, speed is needed to further exploit the success. Speed usually depends on preliminary planning as well as co-operation between units which results in the enemy’s inability to develop effective counter measures to defeat the attacker’s initiative. The third factor, superiority in firepower and material is necessary because without superiority, movement is difficult or ceases. Therefore, firepower is considered to be the driving force behind manoeuvre. All these factors were improved by technical advances not only in weapon systems such as tanks and airplanes, but also through advances in communication between combat units.

But Blitzkrieg operates only on the tactical level of war, and the other levels of a redefined Blitzkrieg must be considered. The operational level includes the conduct of movement and the mobilization and transportation of troops and equipment, which also was greatly improved during World War II. The extension of Germany’s street and railroad network, the extension of lines of communication and the building of airfields gave higher command echelons new and improved ways to plan and conduct the combat operations. Again it was the advances in technology which made these improved manoeuvres possible.  Last level of a redefined Blitzkrieg is the strategic level at which co-operation between the political, economic and military agencies define the political wartime objectives. Nations go to war because no agreement can be found politically. One of the best examples to illustrate this point is the earlier mentioned discussion about Bismarck’s successors and the lapse of agreements with other nations which eventually resulted in the military situation Germany found itself prior to World War I.  At the end, Blitzkrieg was the endeavour to strengthen Germany’s economy, military and political status in the world by using Blitzoperationnen which were conducted to overwhelm the enemies, one after the other, in a series of individual, successive campaigns that would only last a short time. By isolating a particular opponent and thus localizing the conflict, it would be possible to avoid the risk of a long, drawn out, multi-front. These Blitzoperationnen were further more conducted to strengthen Germany’s economy, military power and its need for raw materials which were all requirements that had to be satisfied before the next Blitzoperation against another enemy could be conducted. By conducting only localized, short and decisive campaigns, civilian population stayed motivated and the wars would not become a strain on the endurance of the people as well as the existing economy. Germany’s economy had to be mobilized to some extent, especially in the beginning of the Blitzkrieg due to the indispensable prerequisite of a strategic first-strike capacity, but with successful taking of other countries, the wartime mobilization in the homeland was downgraded tremendously due to the foreign economies which were used extensively in the following Blitzoperationnen. Another aspect of the strategy was use of political means to gain new territory whenever possible. By finding weak points in the collective security of Europe and using economical and political infiltration tactics, new territories could be won without any Rifle fire.